





Piracy

South East Asia



ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



South East Asia

26%

of all recorded incidents in South East Asia were armed robberies at sea

A total of **99 boardings** were reported throughout South East Asia in 2024 compared with 104 in 2023

INSIGHT

While the **99** incidents recorded in 2024 reflect a decrease of **5%** as compared with 104 recorded incidents in 2023, the recent increasing aggressiveness on the part of perpetrators is a concern.

With perpetrators becoming more aggressive, the number of reported successful armed robberies rose by **46%**, while the number of hijackings doubled. Meanwhile, the number of boardings in which no property was stolen, a category likely to be under-reported, increased by **16%**. Although no property was stolen in these incidents, **15** did involve perpetrators that were armed, representing a **6%** decrease compared with the 2023 figures. In 2024 there were two hijackings; both involving tugs with barges transporting bio diesel on the Java Sea.

Kidnappings of seafarers have ceased since 2020.

The Singapore Strait remains the site of the highest frequency of vessel boardings, representing **70%** of the total in 2024, where **94%** of incidents involve vessels that are underway.

46%

51%

61%

2


Successful **armed robberies** increased

Of all incidents involve armed perpetrators

Of incidents result in **property loss**

Two tugs towing cargos of bio diesel were **hijacked**

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



South East Asia

70%


of all incidents in South East Asia took place within the Singapore Strait

With well over half of the incidents in South East Asia taking place within the Singapore Strait, the area will continue to be the focus of concern in 2025 INSIGHT

During 2024 **bulk carriers and barges** experienced the **highest frequency of boardings**

In view of continued under reporting, South East Asia's **5% decrease** of reported incidents in 2024 might be attributable to a lack of reporting rather than an actual decline in activity, although the trend with an increasing proportion of incidents taking place in the Singapore Strait is forecast to continue. Of the reported incidents, only **7 involved tankers (10%). 47 incidents involved bulk carriers (70%) and 8 incidents involved barges (12%).** Like 2023, no container or cruise vessels were boarded in the strait in 2024. Meanwhile, **36% of the incidents in the Singapore Strait were failed attacks**, which could illustrate a higher level of awareness amongst crew on board the vessels in transit. Compared with the **24 failed attacks**, there were **15 thefts (22%)** and **28 armed robberies (42%)**. It is likely that perpetrators are carrying knives during all boardings, although these are not always seen by the crew.

Although there was a **3% increase** in the number of incidents **(67** incidents in 2024 and **65** in 2023) there were **only 4 that did not involve vessels underway.**






involved tankers

of all incidents of all incidents

70%

of all incidents involved bulk carriers

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



South East Asia

152%

increase in Singapore Strait armed attacks

67 incidents in total of which 70% targeted bulk carriers and 12% barges; 94% involve vessels underway in transit

INSIGHT

While the total number of reported incidents did not change significantly as compared with 2023, an increase in violent attacks is cause for concern.


64%

of reported incidents resulted in property being stolen

Fortunately, incidents of crew being injured are rare, although perpetrators have become more aggressive. The perpetrators' continued focus on bulk carriers and barges is expected to continue. As in years past, the challenges for law enforcement agencies posed by the intersecting borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore within the strait will continue to stymie the hot pursuit of perpetrators. Vessels in transit are most vulnerable, as all but four incidents involved vessels underway in 2024. No container or cruise vessels were boarded in the strait in 2024. Although weapons are not always seen, it is likely that perpetrators of thefts are carrying knives that they are increasingly prone to use if confronted.

8% OTHER


ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



INSIGHT

Operators of bulk carriers are well-advised to **ensure awareness amongst crew on board vessels** transiting the Singapore Strait.

Moreover, crew serving on bulk carriers have been subjected to more violent attacks as compared with crew on other vessel types.




With no significant change in the total number of incidents recorded in the strait, perpetrators maintained their attention on **bulk carriers**, which **accounted for 70%** of all Singapore Strait boardings while **tankers accounted for 10%** of all boardings. The vulnerability is higher during hours of darkness, when stealthy perpetrators take advantage of slow-moving vessels passing through this bottleneck, leveraging on the jurisdictional challenges posed by the intersecting borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. **The Singapore Strait is the site of 70% of all recorded incidents within South East Asia. Despite a slight increase of boardings, 36% are failed**, indicating that an aware crew is an effective deterrent. No container or cruise vessels were boarded in the strait in 2024.




Naval operation

Middle East

Gulf of Oman Persian Gulf





Middle East

4

4 vessel detentions in 2024 (2 incidents in 2023)

Iran has continued its policy of potentially seizing and detaining vessels related to commercial disputes over its oil trading under US and EU sanctions

INSIGHT

The 2024 seizures included the ST NIKOLAS in January as well as the Israel-linked container ship MSC ARIES in April, in addition to two smaller vessels trading exclusively in the region. These incidents were examples of different aspects of Iranian seizure policy. In addition to genuine law enforcement operations against widespread fuel smuggling, the two former cases were linked to conflicts related to the sanctioned crude oil trade and to Iran's long-standing conflict with Israel respectively.

While the **overall number of cases remained low** throughout the year, the potential for vessel seizures in the future remains. Based on the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia since 2023, seizures of merchant ships in international trade are most likely in the Gulf of Oman rather than in the Persian Gulf.

Renewed pressure on Iran by the incoming Trump administration in the US may lead to an increasing number of commercial disputes linked to Iran's so-called "shadow fleet" operations. These vessels are mostly used to transport crude oil towards Asia where large quantities are bought by local Chinese refineries which are not subject to the US sanctions regime.






Insurgent attacks

Middle East

Gulf of Aden Red Sea



ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Middle East

79

attacks against merchant ships in 2024

Houthi forces continued their campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden throughout the year, leading to a **sustained decrease in maritime traffic**

INSIGHT

In November 2023, the boarding of the GALAXY LEADER marked the beginning of the Houthi campaign against commercial shipping. The Yemen-based Houthis frequently stated that they are carrying out attacks against merchant ships in opposition to Israeli military operations in Gaza.

While the Houthi agenda is obviously a lot broader, the war in Gaza remains ongoing, meaning that the Houthis had no reason to stop their campaign. While the number of attacks against commercial ships dropped in recent months compared to the first half of the year, the threat has been firmly established.

Attacks with aerial drones and missiles as well as naval drones had severe implications for several merchant ships. Seafarers have been injured or even killed, ships have been severely damaged and even had to be abandoned in some cases. Aside from these headline-grabbing incidents, the Houthi campaign had a sustained impact on maritime traffic. The number of ships transiting through the Bab el Mandeb has dropped to a level of 40-50% compared to the "normal" level.

It is unlikely that maritime traffic will decrease further. The current level has remained virtually unchanged since late January. The decision to return to the Red Sea will very likely be determined by economic factors. e.g. insurance premiums or pressure from charterers, possibly supported by political declarations that would placate the Houthis.

RiskIntelligence




Kidnap-for-ransom

Suspicious activity

Smuggling


Gulf of Guinea



Kidnap-for-ransom

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Oulf of Guinea

02

kidnap-for-ransom attacks against merchant ships in 2024

Kidnappings of seafarers have fortunately become rare since 2021. Conditions for another surge in attacks nevertheless remain in place and should be closely monitored

INSIGHT

The overall number of attacks that involved the kidnapping of seafarers from merchant ships in the Gulf of Guinea remained at **just** two incidents in 2024, the same as the previous year. While this figure remaining low is certainly good news, there remains a broad range of other security challenges at sea throughout the region. Moreover, the threat level was underlined by two attempted kidnap-for-ransom attacks on the same day in December.

Despite a lack of concrete data, a lot of circumstantial evidence suggests that **illicit activities in the maritime environment have even increased in recent years**. These are often closely related, e.g. illegal fishing and illicit ship-to-ship operations or smuggling of various types of cargoes.


Piracy, including high-profile attacks against merchant ships, has always been merely one symptom of a general lack of security at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Moreover, **the situation is heavily influenced by land-based factors** in Nigeria where the security landscape remains fragile throughout the country and particularly in the Niger Delta. Mitigation measures such as those outlined in BMP West Africa therefore remain important. Maritime operators should also emphasise crew vigilance and regular security drills.

Naval responses to incidents are likely be much quicker relatively close to the coastline as coastal countries have to cope with limited naval capabilities, allowing mainly for operations close to ports and naval bases.

Suspicious activity

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Oulf of Guinea


06

suspicious incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2024

While the number of incidents remains low, ongoing reports show that seafarers continue to have a negative view on security at sea across the region

INSIGHT

Six incidents were reported as suspicious in 2024, four more than during the previous year. While this is a **low number compared** to the height of the piracy threat in 2019 and 2020, it is important to note that seafarers apparently continue to have concerns about the security situation when they are operating in the region.




It is easy to look at the individual incidents and dismiss them for a lack of threatening behaviour. The simple fact that these cases were officially reported underlines that crews on merchant ships are still not entirely comfortable when their ships are calling at ports or terminals across West and Central Africa.

While this may be partly due to the reputation of the region, it is vital to recognise that the underlying conditions for a resurgence of piracy remain. The security situation on land remains complicated, particularly in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as well as on the neighbouring Bakassi peninsula in Cameroon. Kidnap-for-ransom attackers have used bases in these areas in the past, and organised criminal groups remain highly active there. The fact that these groups have chosen to focus on other activities rather than on piracy only shows that these are currently considered to be more lucrative.

Smuggling

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



© Gulf of Guinea

10.7

tonnes in one incident as record cocaine seizure

The increasing problems of cocaine smuggling through West Africa were highlighted by **several large seizures**, including a record haul from a fishing vessel in March

INSIGHT

Cocaine smuggling through West Africa has significant impacts, transforming the region into a transit hub for drug trafficking networks targeting Europe and beyond. This was underlined by several large cocaine seizures in 2024, both at sea and on land. Considering the scale of these seizures, it is at least plausible to assume that West Africa is playing an increasingly important role in the global cocaine trade.

The use of maritime routes has increased, with traffickers relying on container ships, fishing and other vessels to transport cocaine. This activity **undermines regional maritime security**, as it often involves sophisticated criminal networks capable of evading detection.

Consequences include strained resources as navies and coastguards face challenges in monitoring vast coastlines and maritime spaces with limited resources and technology.

Corruption and instability are knock-on impacts, potentially affecting legitimate maritime trade and governance.


Efforts to combat maritime drug trafficking include international partnerships, capacity-building initiatives for regional navies, and improved surveillance technologies. However, these measures are challenged by the scale and sophistication of smuggling operations.



Maritime risk

Attacks against ports and merchant ships

Black Sea



Maritime risk

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Black Sea


43

incidents in 2024

In 2024, Ukrainian forces continued longrange strikes on Russian naval and energy infrastructure while several mine incidents were also reported

INSIGHT

In Russia and Russian-held territory, **36 war-related incidents** with maritime implications were recorded for 2024, compared to **24 incidents in 2023**. The increase in incidents in 2024 was predominately based on more Ukrainian long-range attacks inside Russia (like Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Rostov-on-Don) while the effort in 2023 was mainly focused on Crimea.



Incidents for 2024 included **14 attacks against naval assets** such as vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and **12 confirmed strikes on energy infrastructure** such as oil depots and refineries. The incidents show **how Ukraine intends to keep the pressure on the Russian Black Sea Fleet**, thereby forcing the Russian navy to stay protected inside the Novorossiysk naval base. This allows Ukraine to keep the unilateral corridor to its Black Sea ports running.

In addition, attacks on energy infrastructure highlight continuing Ukrainian efforts to target Russian oil and energy exports to hurt the Russian economy. These operations are likely to continue in 2025.

The number of **reported mine incidents in the Black Sea decreased to seven in 2024**, although some underreporting is possible. Five of the incidents were reported in the Odesa region. This is consistent with minefields along the Ukrainian coast from the beginning of the war, and how the prevailing currents in the Black Sea are likely to cause untethered mines to drift into the north-western corner of the Black Sea.

Attacks against ports and merchant ships

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Black Sea

24

incidents in 2024

Frequent attacks targeting port facilities in Ukraine highlight the ongoing threat of collateral damage for merchant ships

INSIGHT

The total number of incidents is not a significant uptick in threat levels or volatility in relation to maritime operations in the Black Sea. However, it **underlines the continuation of the threat picture** since Russia's invasion in February 2022.

Most incidents were reported during the late summer and early autumn, which also correlates with the trend in 2023. It is likely that the weather during these months is the most advantageous for military operations. Overall, 16 ships (compared with 12 in 2023) were involved in incidents during 2024, a number which includes local ferries and tugs.

Of these incidents, eight occurred while the ships were in Ukrainian ports where one vessel was impacted by two attacks. One incident involved a vessel during a southbound transit through the Black Sea. At the same time, it is worth noting that with an estimated total of over 3000 vessels transits to the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Pivdenny and Chornomorsk since July 2023, the number of ships involved in security incidents is relatively low.


One major difference between 2023 and 2024 was the seemingly deliberate targeting of two merchant ships while they were located in the Ukrainian ports of Pivdenny and Odesa respectively. Russia claimed at the time that both vessels were transporting military equipment and were therefore legitimate targets. The claims were unsubstantiated, and it seems more likely that the attacks were a show of force by the Russian military to prove their capabilities in an attempt to deter merchant ship calls at Ukrainian Black Sea ports.





Armed robbery at sea

Gulf of Mexico



Armed robbery at sea

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



© Gulf of Mexico

05

incidents in 2024

A total of seven high-profile piracy events were reported in the Gulf of Mexico with **five armed robberies** confirmed and two incidents of suspicious activity

INSIGHT

Armed robberies and suspicious activity in the Bay of Campeche surged through the end of 2024 after a steep decline in 2023. Seven incidents – including two suspicious incidents – were reported in 2024. Two of those involved offshore platforms, the other five offshore supply vessels.

High-profile incidents were not reported in 2023, signaling a lower incidence of criminal activity in the area. Although underreporting is an issue, mainly in relation to assets owned or operated by Mexico's national oil company Pemex, official reports of incidents at sea indicate that **2023 saw a decline in the number of events.**

A cluster of high-profile events was then reported in late 2024, following the patterns established in the past decade. Although oil platforms continue to be targeted by armed assailants looking for crew valuables and self-contained breathing apparatus, offshore support vessels are a recurrent target as well.

Despite drawing the attention of international observers, maritime policing continues to be inadequate. Coastguard assets are reported to arrive several hours after an incident and ongoing naval deployments have not deterred criminals from targeting larger vessels off the coast of the Mexican states Tabasco and Campeche.






Maritime risk

Cocaine smuggling


Latin America and Caribbean



Maritime risk

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024



Latin America and Caribbean

09

incidents in 2024 (1 in 2023)

Criminal and insurgency groups organisations were responsible for a ninefold increase in the number of incidents reported between 2023 and 2024, with most of them concentrated in Haiti

INSIGHT

In 2024, the region reported an uptick of events linked to insurgencies and criminal groups which resort to violence against security forces in an unconventional fashion. Most of the events were concentrated in Haiti after local groups gathered under a gang alliance which improved their operational capabilities. Unlike in previous years, several gang groups have shown increased interest in attacking port personnel and maritime facilities, including vessels at berth, to leverage their criminal and political goals.

During the past year, violent crime also saw a notable increase in Ecuador. Youth gangs and larger groups continue to wage war between each other and target security officials. Despite increased military deployments, armed groups continue undeterred and are expected to deepen their influence in proximity to port premises and within coastal communities.

The existence of insurgencies and the prevalence of drug trafficking is expected to continue triggering violent conflict. Depending on the area of these conflicts, they may also be a threat to commercial maritime operations.

Cocaine smuggling

MARITIME SECURITY

ANNUAL INCIDENT FIGURES 2024


INSIGHT


Cocaine smuggling on maritime routes poses significant challenges due to the vastness of the oceans and the adaptability of criminal organizations. Traffickers exploit the size and complexity of global shipping networks, using merchant ships, fishing vessels as well as private yachts to conceal drugs. They also employ sophisticated and constantly changing methods and routes.

In South America, cocaine is smuggled through various ports which are not limited to producer countries. All types of merchant ships may be affected but container ships are most often targeted as they offer fast and convenient transport to lucrative markets, particularly in Europe.

On the other side of the Atlantic, cocaine is increasingly seized in medium-sized ports across the continent. Criminal organisations seem to have shifted their activities away from their traditional import hubs, i.e. Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg.

MARITIME SMUGGLING ROUTES







Do you have questions about the system?

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